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Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Signaling When (and When Not) to Be Cautious and Self-Protective: Impulsive and Reflective Trust in Close Relationships Sandra L. Murray, Rebecca T. Pinkus, John G. Holmes, Brianna Harris, Sarah Gomillion, Maya Aloni, Jaye L. Derrick, and Sadie Leder Online First Publication, March 28, 2011. doi: 10.1037/a0023233 CITATION Murray, S. L., Pinkus, R. T., Holmes, J. G., Harris, B., Gomillion, S., Aloni, M., Derrick, J. L., & Leder, S. (2011, March 28). Signaling When (and When Not) to Be Cautious and Self-Protective: Impulsive and Reflective Trust in Close Relationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. Advance online publication. doi: 10.1037/a0023233 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology ©2011 American Psychological Association 2011, Vol. ●●, No. ●, 000–000 0022-3514/11/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0023233 Signaling When (and When Not) to Be Cautious and Self-Protective: Impulsive and Reflective Trust in Close Relationships Sandra L. Murray Rebecca T. Pinkus University at Buffalo, State University of New York University of Western Sydney John G. Holmes Brianna Harris, Sarah Gomillion, and Maya Aloni University of Waterloo University at Buffalo, State University of New York Jaye L. Derrick Sadie Leder Research Institute on Addictions University at Buffalo, State University of New York Adual process model is proposed to explain how automatic evaluative associations to the partner (i.e., impulsive trust) and deliberative expectations of partner caring (i.e., reflective trust) interact to govern self-protection in romantic relationships. Experimental and correlational studies of dating and marital relationships supported the model. Subliminally conditioning more positive evaluative associations to the partner increased confidence in the partner’s caring, suggesting that trust has an impulsive basis. Being high on impulsive trust (i.e., more positive evaluative associations to the partner on the Implicit Association Test; Zayas & Shoda, 2005) also reduced the automatic inclination to distance in response to doubts about the partner’s trustworthiness. It similarly reduced self-protective behavioral reactions to these reflective trust concerns. The studies further revealed that the effects of impulsive trust depend on working memory capacity: Being high on impulsive trust inoculated against reflective trust concerns for people low on working memory capacity. Keywords: trust, automaticity, risk regulation, working memory capacity, IAT Romantic relationships are riddled with reason to self-protect set aside her need to avoid his rejection and, instead, solicit his against the possibility of rejection. Such caution is central to cooperation, she needs to know whether it is safe for her to depend interdependent life because conflicts of interest are inevitable onHarrytomeetherneeds(Holmes&Rempel,1989;Reis,Clark, (Murray & Holmes, 2009). Imagine a conflict common to many &Holmes, 2004; Simpson, 2007). households. Fastidious to her core, Sally loves a clean house, but Accordingtotheriskregulationmodel,trustinaspecificpartner her partner, Harry, does not share her appreciation for sparkling signals the safety of approach (Murray & Holmes, 2009; Murray, counters and glowing hardwood. Sally cannot achieve her goal of Holmes, & Collins, 2006). Trust is experienced as a state of spotlessness without cooperation from Harry, but soliciting his comfort (or unease) in the partner’s presence, as a basic apprehen- help leaves her vulnerable to his nonresponsiveness. For Sally to sion of gain (or loss) through dependence on the partner (Deutsch, 1973; Holmes & Rempel, 1989). Being more trusting signals the possibility of gain, releases people from self-protective concerns, and allows approaching connection to the partner. In contrast, Sandra L. Murray, Brianna Harris, Sarah Gomillion, Maya Aloni, and being less trusting signals the possibility of loss, preoccupies Sadie Leder, Department of Psychology, University at Buffalo, State people with self-protection concerns, and motivates suspicious University of New York; Rebecca T. Pinkus, Department of Psychology, states of mind and behavioral efforts to avoid the partner University of Western Sydney, Penrith, New South Wales, Australia; John (Wieselquist, Rusbult, Foster, & Agnew, 1999). G. Holmes, Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada; Jaye L. Derrick, Research Institute on Addictions, Buf- Existing close relationships research uniformly has equated trust falo, New York. with consciously held expectations (Murray et al., 2006). How- This research was supported by National Institute of Mental Health ever, the unconscious mind sometimes knows things that escape Grant MH 60105-08 to Sandra L. Murray. We thank Shira Gabriel and the notice of the conscious mind (Bargh & Morsella, 2008; Dijk- Mark Seery for comments, Wilhelm Hofmann for the measure of working sterhuis, 2010; Wegner, 2002; Wilson, 2002). In this spirit, the memory capacity, Vivian Zayas for assistance with the Implicit Associa- current paper advances a dual process model of trust and self- tion Test, Dale W. Griffin for statistical consultation and comments, and protection in relationships. The model assumes that trust has an numerous undergraduates for their assistance. impulsive (i.e., relatively unconscious) form and a reflective (i.e., Correspondenceconcerningthisarticle should be addressed to Sandra L. Murray, Department of Psychology, Park Hall, University at Buffalo, State relatively conscious) form. Impulsive trust refers to Sally’s auto- University of New York, Buffalo, NY 14260-4110. E-mail: smurray@ matic evaluative association to Harry. Reflective trust refers to her buffalo.edu consciously held expectations about his caring and commitment to 1 2 MURRAYETAL. her (Murray et al., 2006; Wieselquist et al., 1999). This model 1986; Olson & Fazio, 2008). For instance, priming positive objects further assumes that more positive automatic evaluative associa- automatically activates arm movements associated with drawing tions to the partner can inoculate against less trusting conscious things closer; priming negative objects automatically activates arm beliefs in ways that short-circuit self-protection. Thus, being im- movements associated with pushing things away (Chen & Bargh, pulsively trusting can motivate approaching and not avoiding 1999). In our model, automatic evaluative associations to the partners even when reflective trust concerns suggest that caution is partner play a similar orienting function: signaling whether the warranted. partner is safe and to be approached or risky and to be avoided. Consistent with this assumption, people who evidence more pos- Regulating Self-Protection: Impulsive and itive automatic associations to their partner on the Implicit Asso- Reflective Trust ciation Test (IAT) also report greater feelings of relationship Figure 1 presents our dual process model of trust and self- security (Zayas & Shoda, 2005). protection (for similar dual-process models, see Gawronski & Reflective trust corresponds to conscious or considered beliefs Bodenhausen, 2006; Hofmann, Friese, & Strack, 2009; Strack & about one’s value to the partner, a meta-perspective that also Deutsch, 2004; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). This model signals the possibility of good or bad things to come through assumes that impulsive and reflective forms of trust jointly func- dependence (Murray & Holmes, 2009; Murray et al., 2006). That tion to orient behavior. In particular, they together provide a is, reflective trust refers to one’s beliefs about the strength of the behavioral direction to action by revealing the safety of approach, partner’s caring and commitment, now and in the future (Holmes andthereby, control when people self-protect and avoid the partner &Cameron, 2005; Holmes & Rempel, 1989; Murray & Holmes, and when they approach and seek deeper connection. 2009). Thus, Sally’s reflective trust in Harry is captured through her expressions of faith that Harry values her specific qualities and Signaling the Safety of Approach feels close and committed to her (Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 2000). This definition departs from early definitions that located Like prior models, the dual process model in Figure 1 assumes trust in dispositional judgments of the partner’s dependability and that trust involves a feeling of relative comfort and safety (as predictability (Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985). Our dual process opposed to unease and vulnerability) in the partner’s presence model instead locates reflective trust in a dyadic judgment about (Murray et al., 2006; Simpson, 2007). Unlike prior models, this the partner’s particular devotion to oneself, a definition shared by model assumes that this sense of relative safety is represented recent models of attachment and interdependence (Mikulincer & through both associative (i.e., impulsive) and propositional (i.e., Shaver, 2003; Murray & Holmes, 2009; Murray et al., 2006; Reis reflective) processes (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). et al., 2004; Wieselquist et al., 1999). Impulsive trust corresponds to one’s immediate evaluative as- The dashed line connecting impulsive and reflective trust as- sociation to the partner’s presence. That is, impulsive trust refers to sumes that these sentiments inform one another and can send one’s automatic attitude toward the partner. In simple terms, being complementary or contradictory safety signals. The literature on in the partner’s presence activates an immediate evaluative reac- attitudes suggests that automatic evaluative associations are typi- tion. This affective association signals the possibility of good or cally formed through associative learning in concrete situations, bad things to come. Thus, Sally’s impulsive trust in Harry is whereas deliberative expectations are typically formed through captured through her automatic evaluative association to him abstract reasoning (Baccus, Baldwin, & Packer, 2004; Fazio, 1986; (Murray, Holmes, & Pinkus, 2010). This definition of impulsive Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji, 2006; Wilson et al., 2000). This implies trust has long intellectual roots in attitude theory (Fazio, 1986; that actual prior experiences with a partner being more or less Olson & Fazio, 2008). Automatic evaluative associations (i.e., caring and responsive may more strongly condition impulsive than attitudes) are thought to orient people to their social worlds, reflective trust. Consistent with this logic, newlyweds whose part- signaling what is good and to be approached or bad and to be ner behaved less responsively early in their marriage evidenced avoided (Alexopoulos & Ric, 2007; Banaji & Heiphetz, 2010; less positive automatic evaluative associations to their partner after Banse, 2001; Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, & Zhang, 2007; Fazio, 4 years of marriage. However, such concrete early experiences did Figure 1. Adual process model of trust and self-protection in close relationships. IMPULSIVE AND REFLECTIVE TRUST 3 not predict their later explicit beliefs about the partner’s caring behaved nonresponsively automatically activates a behavioral ori- (Murray et al., 2010). Although still sensitive to the partner’s entation (i.e., hostility) for distancing oneself from the partner actual behaviors, reflectively trusting expectations typically shift (Murray et al., 2008). Experiencing chronic concerns about the as people consider their own worthiness of love (Murray, Rose, partner’s trustworthiness also strengthens overtly self-protective Bellavia, Holmes, & Kusche, 2002), explain experiences with behavior (Holmes & Rempel, 1989; Murray et al., 2006). That is, previous relationship partners (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003), and it increases both the tendency to be suspicious in one’s inferences, engage in motivated distortions of ongoing events (Murray, 1999). a mind-set that makes it easier to detect (and avoid) rejection, and Because impulsive trust and reflective trust develop through the tendency to be distancing and avoidant in one’s behavior, a only partially overlapping processes, these sentiments can be dis- reaction that makes rejection less likely and less painful. For sociated. For instance, a low-self-esteem Sally might be high on instance, people who are less trusting read rejection into events as impulsive trust (because Harry treats her well) but low on reflec- ambiguous as their partner being in a bad mood (Murray, Bellavia, tive trust (because she cannot fully convince herself that such Rose, & Griffin, 2003). They also react to daily hurts by behaving kindnesses will always continue). In contrast, a high-self-esteem in a cold and rejecting way toward their partner (Murray et al., Gayle might be low on impulsive trust (because her partner be- 2003). Similarly, people who are less trusting overreact to daily haves reasonably selfishly) but high on reflective trust (because conflicts, treating them as an excuse to withdraw from the rela- she easily generates excuses for such lapses). In fact, prior research tionship (Campbell, Simpson, Boldry, & Rubin, 2010). reveals dissociations between more implicit and explicit relation- Impulsive trust. Ourmodelalsoassumesthatimpulsivetrust ship sentiments (Murray, Derrick, Leder, & Holmes, 2008; Mur- can qualify the influence that reflective trust has over the regula- ray, Holmes, et al., 2009). For instance, more positive evaluative tion of self-protection. How so? Being low on impulsive trust associations to the partner predict greater relationship stability should only reinforce self-protective caution and avoidance in regardless of reported satisfaction (LeBel & Campbell, 2009; Lee, response to doubts about the partner’s caring, because less positive Rogge, & Reis, 2010). Further, people who feel pressured to automatic evaluative associations to the partner echo conscious justify their commitments because they are highly invested and suspicions that approach might not be safe. However, being high have few alternatives claim to be satisfied in their relationships on impulsive trust might have the power to inoculate against even when their automatic reactions to their partner are relatively conscious doubts about the partner’s caring. negative (Scinta & Gable, 2007). Whymight such an effect emerge? First, more positive automatic evaluative associations might function as a chronic or “selfish” goal to The Regulation of Self-Protection approach that neutralizes avoidance goals activated in a specific situation of rejection (Bargh & Huang, 2009). Second, more positive By signaling the safety of approach, the impulsive and reflective automatic evaluative associations to the partner might make the actual bases of trust jointly regulate self-protective caution (as indicated by experience of contemplating rejection less hurtful (Banaji & Heiphetz, their convergent influence on Paths A and B). The model assumes that 2010; Dijksterhuis, 2010; Fazio, 1986). Because interacting with the self-protective caution is exercised through behavioral expressions of partner automatically primes one’s evaluative associations, any con- approach versus avoidance (Murray et al., 2006). In particular, stron- cerns about the partner’s behavior are likely to be mitigated by more ger self-protection concerns promote avoidance (or conversely inhibit positive general evaluations (Kunda & Spencer, 2003; Mikulincer, approach), whereas weaker self-protection concerns promote ap- Hirschberger, Nachmias, & Gillath, 2001). Third, evaluative associ- proach (or conversely inhibit avoidance).1 Our model differentiates self-protection into an immediate and automatic inclination to ap- ations are likely to be slow to align or catch up with newly emerging proach versus avoid the partner (Path A) and a subsequent, sometimes doubts that could undermine such positive approach signals. Indeed, corrective, overt behavioral reaction (Path B). We draw the distinction automatic evaluations are thought to be asymmetrically malleable, between automatic inclinations and overt behavior because not every more readily formed than undone (Gregg et al., 2006). Therefore, inclination is acted upon. Instead, people can correct automatic be- being high on impulsive trust might provide a counterweight to havioral inclinations when they are motivated and able to do so emerging doubts, because such automatic evaluative sentiment stub- (Murray et al., 2008; Murray & Holmes, 2009; Olson & Fazio, 2008). bornly retains its relative positivity. Fourth, automatic evaluative Imagine Sally and Harry have an argument serious enough to cause sentiments can elicit corresponding behaviors even when contradic- her to question his devotion to her. Such doubts activate the automatic tory explicit sentiments are accessible in memory (Wilson et al., inclination to self-protect and withdraw (Murray et al., 2008). When 2000). For instance, unconsciously primed thoughts of security Sally is depleted, she might act on such intent, but when better heighten empathy (Mikulincer, Gillath, et al., 2001), diminish out- judgment prevails she might apologize instead (Finkel & Campbell, group derogation (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2001), and increase the 2001). desire to seek support from others in dealing with a personal crisis Reflective trust. Existing research reveals how being low (Pierce & Lydon, 1998), even when conscious reservations oppose versus high on reflective trust can regulate automatic self- such behaviors. protective inclinations and overtly self-protective behavior. Expe- In sum, our dual process model assumes that impulsive trust can riencing state doubts about a partner’s trustworthiness triggers modulate the safety signal conveyed by reflective trust concerns. automatic efforts to avoid the partner (Murray et al., 2006). For example, preoccupying participants with the fear that their dating 1 Our model assumes that approach and avoidance are polar opposites at partner will discover their secret selves spontaneously elicits a the level of behavioral expression (Cacioppo, Gardner, Berntson, 1999). vigilant and prevention-oriented mind-set (Cavallo, Fitzsimons, & Accordingly, approach necessarily implies inhibited avoidance and avoid- Holmes, 2010). Similarly, thinking of a time when a partner ance necessarily implies inhibited approach.
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